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NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL
CASES AND THE RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL*
Warren Freedman *
I. THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN OR PUBLIC TRIAL
A fair and open trial has long been recognized as a right of an
accused under the Sixth Amendment to our Constitution: '
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
* Citations to and discussions of relevant Nebraska and general materials
have been supplied by Staff member Sheldon Krantz, presently a junior,
University of Nebraska College of Law.
*"A.B., 1943, Rutgers University; LL.B., 1949, Columbia University. Mem-
ber of the New York and United States Supreme Court Bars. Author,
ALLERGY AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961); RICHARDS, IN-
SURANCE (5th ed. 1952).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. As to the "speedy" trial to which this amend-
ment entitles an accused, the interval between the filing of the indict-
ment and the commencement of trial must be reasonably brief. How-
ever, should the accused acquiesce in or himself request successive
delays of his trial, he in effect has legally waived his guaranteed right
to a speedy trial. People v. White, 2 N.Y.2d 220, 140 N.E.2d 258, 159
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1957). But, in People v. Piscitello, 7 N.Y.2d 387, 165
N.E.2d 849 (1960), the New York Court of Appeals reversed a convic-
tion entered on a plea of guilty where the accused had not waived his
right to a speedy trial. The court held that the fact that he had been
held for seventeen months in the federal detention headquarters, await-
ing disposition of federal charges, afforded no explanation nor excuse
for the delay; the accused could have been produced in the state court
on request and then returned to federal custody.
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Similarly it is so under more than forty state constitutions, 2 in-
cluding express statutory guarantees such as in Section 12 of the
New York Civil Rights Law and Section 4 of the New York
Judiciary Law, the latter statute requiring that "the sittings of
every court within this State shall be public and every citizen may
freely attend the same .... -"3 It is questionable, however, whether in
New York the public has any legally enforceable right to attend
trials in view of the pronouncement in United Press Ass'n v.
Valente4 to be discussed hereinafter. Ohio, on the other hand, has
vested in the public an enforceable right to attend an open trial 5
under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, to wit: "All
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in
his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law .... "
Justification for open trials dates back to the traditional Anglo-
Saxon distrust of secret trials ascribed to the Star Chamber. In
these early days the English town, village, or city had responsi-
bility for apprehending criminals, rather than any national gov-
ernmental body, and it was therefore natural to expect the public
to report the facts of the crime, and then to judge the guilt of the
offender. The modern jury system grew up from such beginnings.
In the Oliver case,6 the United States Supreme Court seemed to
justify open trials as (1) a safeguard against attempts to use the
courts as an instrument of persecution; (2) a notice to witnesses who
will be encouraged to give voluntarily pertinent and truthful
evidence; and (3) a public feeling of confidence in judicial remedies
by observing the courts in action. The Supreme Court of Montana
2The Nebraska Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person or by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of accusation, and to have a
copy thereof; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11
(emphasis added). [Ed.]
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-311 (Reissue 1956) provides: "All judicial pro-
ceedings must be public unless specially provided by statute." [Ed.]
4 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). For lower court opinion, see 281
App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1953).
5 E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
6 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The court held that Michigan had
denied a grand jury witness due process of law by convicting him of
contempt in a trial from which the public was excluded.
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thirty-two years earlier had expressed a similar view in the
Keeler case: I
Primarily it is for the benefit of the accused .... But it likewise
involves questions of public interest and concern. The people are
interested in knowing, and have the right to know, how their serv-
ants-the judge, county attorney, sheriff, and clerk-conduct the
public's business .... But the public is interested in every criminal
trial that court officers and jurors are kept keenly alive to a sense
of their responsibility and the importance of their functions, and
interested spectators by their presence are the most potent in-
fluence to accomplish this desired end.
The famous Blackstone had opined in 1768 that: 8
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence
of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth,
than the private and secret examination taken down in writing
before an officer or his clerk, 'as was the usual practice' in the
ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their prac-
tice from the civil law; 'for' a witness may frequently depose that
in private which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and
solemn tribunal. There, 'too' an artful or careless scribe may make
a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his depositions
in his own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to correct
and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which he can never
do after a written deposition is once taken.
The meaning of "open" trial has been construed by perhaps a
majority of courts as requiring a public trial where all members
of the public must be allowed to attend within the physical limits
of the court roomY Other courts have delimited the right by de-
claring that "public" merely means that the trial may not be a
"secret" one and that a judge may exclude certain members of
the public as long as a reasonable group remains. In jurisdictions
applying the former rule, the court must justify any exclusion,
while in those adopting the latter the accused must affirmatively
demonstrate that he has been hurt by the exclusion. 10 The minority
7 State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 218, 156 Pac. 1080, 1083-84 (1916).
8 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373-74 (Kerr ed. 1876).
9 In Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916), the defendant
in a murder trial contested the move of his trial from a small courtroom
to a movie theater. The theater was crowded with spectators. The court,
in reversing the conviction of the defendant, said: "The law requires
that trials shall be public, but this requirement is satisfied by admitting
those who could conveniently be accommodated in the court-room where
the law requires such trials to be held, without interrupting the calm
and orderly course of justice." Id. at 204, 158 N.W. at 932. [Ed.]
10 Nebraska apparently follows the former rule. In Rhoades v. State, 102
Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918), the trial court, after conferring with the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
view would seem to be patently wrong, since, in a given situation,
it may well be impossible to determine just in what way the
accused was hurt. However, Professor Cooley has argued:11
The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;
that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly
condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep
his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly ob-
served if, without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable proportion
of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those per-
sons whose presence could be of no service to the accused, and
who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity, are
excluded altogether.
It is this very emphasis upon proof that the defendant must suffer
damage before the public can be excluded that has bothered the
courts. It is anomalous to condone a violation of fundamental con-
stitutional rights because the individual cannot show specific dam-
age-the violation of the right itself constitutes the damage. To
compel production of specific damage items in most cases, in fact,
amounts to a total deprivation of the right. The correct view
would seem to be that the accused should not be deprived of his
right to have the public attend the trial, unless it is demonstrated
that granting of the right will interfere with the administration
of justice.1 2
The right of the accused to an open or public trial is, however,
complaining witness in a rape prosecution, ordered those present merely
as listeners to retire from the courtroom until authorized to return. The
defendant contended that this was a violation of the Nebraska Constitu-
tion, Article 1, section 11, which guarantees a defendant the right to a
public trial. This objection -was sustained. "Under the Constitutional
provision, the general public, as such, cannot be excluded. The public is
admitted so that it may know that the accused is fairly dealt with and
so that his triers will be keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility.
Reasonable restrictions, for want of space, upon the number admitted are
permissible; also upon persons of immature years where the evidence
relates to scandalous, indecent or immoral matters. When those present
conduct themselves in a manner tending to obstruct justice, or tending
to give either the state or the defendant an unfair trial, the courtroom
may be cleared of them. Other occasions may arise when, in the dis-
cretion of the court, such order would be permissible. It is difficult to
say that the court's order in this instance did not exclude the general
public." Id. at 752, 169 N.W. at 434. [Ed.]
11COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 380-81 (5th ed. 1883).
12 For a collection of cases discussing this right, see Annot., Exclusion of
Public During Criminal Trial, 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945). [Ed.]
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but part of the more significant right to a fair trial.18 Indeed, the
failure to understand the difference between an open and a fair
trial has been the subject of controversy between the courts and
the press, radio, and television industries seeking protection of free-
dom of press and of speech under the First Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has this past term ruled in a 5-4 decision
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the right to a public trial
was waived by a failure to object. In this case, Levine v. United
States,14 the court's earlier decision in the Oliver case was expressly
distinguished: 15
This case is wholly unlike . . . Oliver .... This is not a case
where it is or could be charged that the judge deliberately enforced
secrecy in order to be free of the safeguards of the public's scrutiny;
nor is it urged that publicity would in the slightest have affected
the conduct of the proceedings or their result. Nor are we dealing
with a situation where prejudice, attributable to secrecy, is found
to be sufficiently impressive to render irrelevant failure to make
a timely objection at proceedings like these. This is obviously not
such a case. Due regard generally for the public nature of thejudicial process does not require disregard of the solid demands
of the fair administration of justice in favor of a party who, at the
appropriate time and acting under advice of counsel, saw no dis-
regard of a right, but raises an abstract claim only as an after-
thought on appeal.
Three dissenters were perturbed because the majority opinion not
13 The question of a fair trial has been interestingly raised by those mis-
demeanor cases conducted in justice of the peace courts and presided
over by justices having a pecuniary interest in their own decisions. The
classic case is Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Tumey had been
tried and convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor by a mayor's court
in North College Hill, Ohio, after protesting that he could not receive
a fair trial because of the mayor's own financial interest in his convic-
tion. He was tried before the mayor without a jury, without opportunity
for retrial, and with review of his case confined to questions of law only.
In event of acquittal, the mayor, of course, received no compensation.
In this case the mayor's fee and costs were twelve dollars. The United
States Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction and disqualifying the
mayor, said: "Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the lat-
ter due process of law." Id. at 532. Of course, this constitutional objec-
tion may be waived, albeit improperly, by the accused himself; indeed,
a few courts hold that due process of law is not denied where an appeal
on facts and on law may immediately be taken from the trial judge's
decision.
14362 U.S. 610 (1960).
15Id. at 619-20.
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only repudiated the Oliver case "in whole or in part," but simul-
taneously had approved "a secret trial procedure which apologists
for the Star Chamber have always been careful to deny even that
unlimited and unlamented court ever used.""'6 The Levine de-
cision also strengthened the Court's position in Brown v. United
States," although the latter case did not involve the identical "ex-
clusion" of the public from the courtroom, as did the Levine case.
Brown had been summoned to appear before a federal grand jury
investigating violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. Although
he was assured that he would be granted immunity from prosecu-
tion, Brown refused to answer certain questions on the ground
that the answers might tend to incriminate him. He was brought
before the judge who, after ordering the courtroom cleared, re-
peated the questions to Brown, who persisted in his refusal to
answer. The judge forthwith held him guilty of contempt "com-
mitted in the actual presence of the court.""' Brown's conviction
was affirmed on appeal. Indeed, the Levine and Brown cases held
that the "clearing of the courtroom" was not an exclusion of the
public, because the defendants and their counsel were present
throughout the proceedings, and furthermore, no specific objection
to the "secrecy" of the proceedings was timely made.
The highly publicized New York trial of Minot F. Jelke on
charges of compulsory prostitution gave rise to United Press Ass'n
v. Valente,'9 which gave extensive consideration to the elements
of both a public and a fair trial. Trial Judge Valente had ordered
the general public and the press from the courtroom during the
presentation of the State's case, in "the interests of good morals"
and "in the sound administration of justice. '20 The United Press
Association thereupon brought an action to restrain Judge Valente
from enforcing his exclusionary rulings; but the highest New York
court refused to accede to the demand of the press association,
contending that no New York statute conferred any enforceable
right upon the public to attend trials, and even if such a statute
granted the public such a right, the right was conferred on the
public-at-large and not on any individual member of the public.
The Court, in holding against United Press, probably feared that,
16 Id. at 621.
17 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
18 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
19 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
20 On appeal, incidentally, Jelke obtained a reversal of his conviction on
the ground that his right to a public trial had been violated. See State
v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
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if the courts were to rule otherwise, it would deprive an accused
of all power to waive his right to a public trial and thereby prevent
him from taking a course which he may believe best for his own
interest: "To deny the right of waiver in such a situation would
be 'to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement' to the
disadvantage of the accused. '21 Undoubtedly the New York court
presumed that the primary function of a public trial was safe-
guarding the accused against possible unjust persecution based
upon public prejudice and hysteria. It was contended that to give
the public an absolute right to attend, would, in effect, determine
the accused's right in a manner in which he would have had no
voice to argue to the contrary. Any member of the public could
therefore challenge the court's authority and stay the trial in
collateral proceedings in which the accused would again have no
standing to argue to the contrary. The opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals conspicuously omitted, however, any discussion
of the freedom of the press provision of the First Amendment.
Diametrically opposed to the holding of the highest New York
court is the 1955 decision of the Ohio court in E. W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton22 to the effect that newspapers and the public have a right
to attend a trial, which right even the accused may not defeat by
signing a waiver of that right. One Baker was being tried on a
charge of pandering, when the trial judge excluded the general
public and the press from the courtroom, upon the specific request
of Baker. Judge Fulton commented that he as judge had exercised
his discretion in granting defendant's request. One newspaper
then instituted a successful, separate proceeding to restrain Judge
Fulton upon the ground that the Ohio Constitution had conferred
on the public a right to open trial; and thus the press and the
general public re-entered the courtroom while the trial was in
progress.
It is submitted that, although neither the New York nor the
Ohio court discussed the First Amendment freedom of the press,
the tenor of these two decisions does not vest in newspapers any
absolute right to attend trials, which right of the press is any greater
than the right of the general public. Only as a member of the
general public, in the gathering and dispensing of news to the
public, has the press a right to attend an open trial and report the
21 United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 73, 123 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1954),
quoting United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3rd. Cir. 1949).
22 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
occurrences in the courtroom subject, however, to the right of the
accused to a fair trial.23
In contrast to the Jelke and Baker trial decisions are the numer-
ous instances in which the public is systematically excluded from
the trial of juveniles, upon the assumption that the juvenile's
interest will be better protected in a "closed" trial. A few states
by statute have excluded the public also from prosecutions for
rape, sodomy, adultery, fornication, and the like, possibly upon
the ground of protecting the public morals, the interest of witnesses,
and even the interest of the accused.2 4 The fact that courts seek
to exclude the press evidences the impact of "trial by newspaper"
on the accused's right to a fair trial coupled with the courts' in-
ability to use the contempt power to curb press abuses.25 Fair
administration of justice is impeded when the minds of jurors are
prejudiced, not only during trial, but even before the trial has
begun. In England, however, the courts are free to exercise their
contempt power where newspapers interfere with orderly justice.
But in the United States, appellate courts are very prone to dis-
able a trial judge who has sought to deal effectively with press
interference with the fair administration of criminal trials.
26
It should be noted that this right to open or public trial does not
attach to particular individuals but to the public as a whole, i.e.,
the legal requisite for an individual's standing in court to enforce
such an individual right is lacking. The rationale of this non-
recognition of the individual's right appears to be that the prosecu-
23 Upon this important point, research has uncovered no reported Nebraska
case in which a member of the public has instituted an action to en-
force his right to attend a trial. [Ed.]
24 An exception by statute in Nebraska is a trial to establish the paternity
of children born out of wedlock. NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-112 (Reissue
1954) provides: "It being contrary to public policy that such proceedings
should be open to the general public, no one but the parties, their counsel,
and others having a legitimate interest in the controversy shall be ad-
mitted to the courtroom during the trial of the case." For a rather ex-
haustive discussion of paternity proceedings, with emphasis upon the
New York practices, see Wysong, The Jurisprudence of Labels-Bastardy
as a Case in Point, 39 NEB. L. REV. 648 (1960). [Ed.]
25 In Nebraska, however, an abuse of freedom of the press relating to un-
determined cases in court will sustain a conviction for contempt. Percival
v. State, 45 Neb. 741, 64 N.W. 221 (1895); Bee Publishing Co. v. State, 107
Neb. 74, 185 N.W. 339 (1921); State v. Lovell, 117 Neb. 710, 222 N.W. 625
(1929). [Ed.]
26 See Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1379 (1945). Cf. Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Press as a Limitation on the Contempt Power, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 313
(1956). [Ed.]
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tor defends the public interest, and the public or the press has no
right to intervene in the criminal proceedings.2 7 Any remedy to the
public, where the prosecutor fails to assert the public interest,
must be through the political process. However, it can be argued
that the public's right should at least be vindicated by allowing an
individual member of the public to adjudicate in court that very
right of the public. To compel the press and the general public
to resort, for example, to amicus curie briefs, by permission of the
court, is hardly satisfactory to protect freedom of the press and the
public's right to know.2
8
27 But the newspaper publicity given to a recent Kentucky police court
"persecution" of an elderly Negro who was convicted of loitering and
disorderly conduct is of more than passing interest. Under Kentucky
law there was no right of appeal, but the Louisville press took an in-
terest in the defendant's plight. Finally, on March 21, 1960, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the convictions and held, unanimously,
that the Kentucky criminal convictions were unconstitutional as founded
upon insufficient evidence. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
(1960). Mr. Justice Black, writing for the court, determined that there
was no evidence to support either charge, and that it was "a violation
of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his
guilt." Id. at 206.
It should, perhaps, be noted that in Kentucky the justice of the peace,
in order to qualify for election, requires no legal training nor even formal
education; such Kentucky courts have been frequently criticized also for
their failure to maintain the dignity and decorum so essential to the
judicial process. Kentucky justices of the peace handle civil cases up
to $2,000 in damages, and criminal cases where punishment does not
exceed one year in prison or a fine of $500 or both. In Roberts v. Noel,
296 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1956), the Kentucky Court of Appeals said of these
minor courts: "[N]o justification exists for perpetuating a system that
is designed and calculated to deprive persons of due process of law. To
say, . . . that the right to trial by a judge free from prejudicial in-
fluences may be waived, is unrealistic for, ... the ordinary person is not
aware of his right to object to the jurisdiction; he assumes that the
court before which he has been taken is a lawfully constituted one."
Id. at 748. Of course, legally, the accused could not waive the court's
power to try him or the jurisdiction of the court, but only the judge's
disqualification. Indeed, the demise of justice of the peace courts in
Kentucky is forthcoming.
28 Mr. Justice Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, has written that some persons maintain "that the 'right to know'
is basic in our liberties and therefore the courtrooms, investigative hear-
ings and all like sessions should be photographed and broadcast. Trials
and investigations, it is said, have educational values to the general
public; and, it is contended, the general public should be admitted so
that they better understand the operations of their government." Douglas,
The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960). But Mr.
Justice Douglas opined that "photographing or broadcasting of trials ...
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II. PHOTOGRAPHING, BROADCASTING, AND
TELEVISING OF COURTROOM PROCEEDINGS
The right to an open and fair trial has been challenged in
recent days by restrictions upon taking press photographs in court,
and by prohibitions against broadcasting or televising of courtroom
proceedings. In 1937 after a series of raucous publicity circuses
during criminal trials which outraged the sense of decency of the
judicial profession, the American Bar Association adopted Canon
35 of its Canons of Judicial Ethics. This dogmatic statement of
principles barred newspaper photographers and radio broadcasters
from court proceedings. Canon 35, as amended in 1952 to cover
television, reads as follows: 29
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during
sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broad-
casting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness
in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconcep-
tions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not
be permitted.
Canon 35 as amended in 1952 qualifies the above pronouncement: 30
Provided that this restriction shall not apply to the broadcasting
or televising, under the supervision of the court, of such portions
of naturalization proceedings (other than the interrogation of
applicants) as are designed and carried out exclusively as a cere-
mony for the purpose of publicly demonstrating in an impressive
manner the essential dignity and the serious nature of naturaliza-
tion.
The press photographers associations and the radio and tele-
vision industry have naturally been aroused by this apparent inter-
ference with freedom of the press. The press photographers have
particularly demonstrated before bench and bar alike that photo-
graphs can be taken surreptitiously and unobtrusively in court-
rooms because modern, versatile camera equipment carries no flash
bulbs and the like. Press photographers contend that discrimina-
tion against them has violated the public's right to be informed.
imperils the fair trial of which we boast. It is not dangerous because
it is new. It is dangerous because of the insidious influences which it
puts to work in the administration of justice." Id. at 840.
29 Canon 35 of the Nebraska Canons of Judicial Ethics was adopted prior
to the adoption by the American Bar Association of the amended version
set out in the text. [Ed.]
30 Ibid.
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All of the other mass media, such as radio and television, have
obviously particular and different potentialities, varying liabilities
and implications for the administration of impartial justice. But
all media are agreed, however, upon the need for some relaxation
of Canon 35. It is argued that Canon 35, in its assumption that
"... . broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated
to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, . . . de-
grade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto
in the mind of the public ....... is an arbitrary and unwarranted
attack upon the media. Particularly distressing to the radio and
television industries is the proposed 1958 revision of Canon 35
offered by a special American Bar Association subcommittee: 3 1
The purpose of judicial proceedings is to ascertain the truth.
Such proceedings should be conducted with fitting dignity and
decorum, in a manner conducive to undisturbed deliberation, in-
dicative of their importance to the people and to the litigants, and
in an atmosphere that bespeaks the responsibilities of those who
are charged with the administration of justice. The taking of photo-
graphs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings
or during any recess thereof and the transmitting or sound record-
ing of such proceedings for broadcasting by radio or television,
introduce extraneous influences which tend to have a detrimental
psychological effect on the participants and to divert them from the
proper objectives of the trial; they should not be permitted.
Proceedings other than judicial proceedings, designed and
carried out primarily as ceremonies, and conducted with dignity
by judges in open court, may properly be photographed in or broad-
cast from the courtroom with the permission and under the super-
vision of the court.
The first "live" telecast of a court trial occurred on December
13, 1953, in an Oklahoma City court.32 Television cameras were
housed in a specially-constructed booth, entirely enclosed, in the
rear of the courtroom. Sound was recorded on a microphone hidden
near the front of the court, while additional lighting was provided
by photo-flood lights placed in the chandeliers. The swearing of
the jury, some of the trial testimony and the sentencing of the
defendant were televised. The films were later shown, after editing,
during news broadcasts. Judge A. P. Van Meter, who presided at
the trial, had a small button fastened to his desk which he could
push at any time to discontinue automatically the operation of the
cameras. The success of this telecast probably encouraged the tele-
3183 ANNUAL REPORTS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 643-44 (1958)
(emphasis added).
32 State v. Manley, No. 22092, Oklahoma County District Court, Oklahoma,
December 22, 1953. [Ed.]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
cast, from a balcony, of the Washburn murder trial in Waco, Texas,
on December 6, 1955. 3 3 The reaction of Texas bench, bar and the
press for the most part, favored some reasonable controls over tele-
vision by the trial judge; it was also felt that consent of witnesses
and jurors particularly to the telecasting was necessary.
In Colorado, on April 7, 1956,34 despite the affidavit of the
accused (who was charged with dynamiting an airplane in flight)
that television coverage of his trial should not be permitted, the
Colorado District Judge permitted radio stations to tape record the
proceedings for later broadcasting, and he permitted television sta-
tions to make sound-on-film movies for later telecasting. Since the
trial judge exercised his discretion, it was contended that no un-
warranted interference with or distraction from the trial resulted.
Yet the exercise of such discretion by a trial judge clearly places
an undue burden upon the judge, particularly since he is often at
the mercy of the press in the manipulation of public opinion of
him and his behavior. This appears to be one of the reasons that
the press photographers and other media advocate a laissez-faire
attitude by the organized Bar toward courtroom photography. How-
ever, the organized bar finds no justification for imposing upon any
judge the requirement that he may or shall use his discretion in
granting or withholding the right to take photographs or to broad-
cast or telecast the judicial proceedings over which he presides,
as does the Supreme Court of Colorado which leaves the matter up
to the discretion of individual trial judges. Indeed the United States
Supreme Court in Craig v. Harney35 has stated that a trial is a public
event; that what transpires in the courtroom is public property;
that those who see and hear what transpires may report it with
impunity; and that there is no special perquisite of the judiciary
which enables it as distinguished from other institutions of demo-
cratic government to suppress, edit or censor events that transpire
before it.
Wisconsin and Rhode Island were unsuccessful recently in
getting their Legislatures to enact statutes barring the telecastihg
'33 The case is reported on appeal on other points in Ex parte Washburn, 161
Tex. Crim. 651, 280 S.W.2d 257 (1955); Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim.
448, 299 S.W.2d 706 (1957). [Ed.]
34 This case was appealed over the defendant's objection and is reported
in Graham v. People, 134 Colo. 290, 302 P.2d 737 (1956), but the instant
question was not discussed. [Ed.] Cf. In re Hearings Concerning Canon
35, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956).
1. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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of court room proceedings. In 1952 New York enacted Section 52
of the Civil Rights Law, which provides:
No person, firm, association or corporation shall televise, broadcast,
take motion pictures or arrange for the televising, broadcasting, or
taking of motion pictures within this state of proceedings, in which
the testimony of witnesses by subpoena or other compulsory process
is or may be taken, conducted by a court, commission, committee,
administrative agency or other tribunal in this state. Any viola-
tion of this section shall be a misdemeanor. 36
Fourteen states in all have similarly banned televising and broad-
casting of trials by officially adopting Canon 35;37 the ban is also
36 In 1959, New York sought to amend Section 52 by adding the following
after the phrase ". . . other tribunal in this state": "[W]ithout prior con-
sent from the judge of the court, chairman or the duly authorized
head of such commission, committee, administrative agency or other
tribunal in the state." The bill was not passed; it was obviously in op-
position to Canon 35, and was severely criticized because (1) it con-
tained no requirement that permission of the accused in a criminal case
be obtained, and (2) it did not require consent of the parties in a civil
action. In opposition to the bill, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York declared: "Relaxation of the ban on the use of movie or
television cameras during trial, even with judicial consent, may subject
witnesses whose demeanor is being weighed by the triers of fact to
additional and unwarranted pressures. Cameras in the court room may
also have the effect of diverting the jury from its proper functions.
Abuses may occur in a situation where a judge, presiding over a 'cele-
brated case,' invites TV cameramen to his court over the express ob-
jections of a criminal defendant or civil litigants. Significantly, Rule
53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure flatly prohibits 'the tak-
ing of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial
proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court
room.' Furthermore, even in the few instances where states do permit
the broadcasting and televising of trials, the trial judge's discretion in
allowing such coverage is subject to objections of witnesses and jurors.
See In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 296 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1956)."
37 On March 24, 1951, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, including Canon 35. Thus, these Canons govern the
conduct of proceedings in all courts in Nebraska. Just what effect this
will have on Nebraska courts and judges has not yet been fully tested.
In March of 1958 a contempt proceeding was commenced by the State
of Nebraska on the relation of the State Bar Association against Judge
James T. English, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District, for al-
lowing the taking of photographs during the sessions and recesses of
the murder trial of George Daniel Jones in Omaha. The Information
affidavit contended that since the State Supreme Court had adopted
Canon 35 and since this was binding on all the Nebraska courts, the
act of Judge English allowing the photographing was in contempt of
the Nebraska Supreme Court. The Answer filed in behalf of Judge
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embodied in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
adopted by the United States Supreme Court for use in all federal
courts. However, former United States Attorney General, Herbert
Brownell, Jr., has urged the courts to remove obstacles from the
path of newsmen and press photographers. 38
The first clear-cut support for television of criminal proceedings
occurred on September 3, 1958, when the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in Lyles v. State39 upheld television coverage
of courtroom proceedings upon grounds that a criminal trial is a
"public event." Lyles, who was given a fifteen-year sentence for
burglary, had contended that the television cameras prevented him
from getting a fair trial. Television pictures were taken in the
courtroom before the jury was selected, although some members
of the panel were in the room during the recess in which the films
were shot. In an opinion by Justice Brett, it was said that: 40
"What transpires in the courtroom is public property. * * * Those
who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.
There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it
. * . to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceed-
ings before it."
English contended that the Nebraska Supreme Court was without juris-
diction to hear the cause as the adoption of Canon 35 was not a manda-
tory direction. The Answer further contended that if the adoption of
Canon 35 was a mandatory direction then it was void and unenforce-
able as in violation of both the Nebraska and United States Constitutions.
The reasons given were that Canon 35: (1) infringed on the right to
a public trial; (2) infringed on the right to freedom of the press; (3) de-
nied equal protection of the law as some media would be forbidden at
trials while others are not, and (4) subjected a judge to an unreasonable
and impossible rule of conduct as he might be guilty of contempt even
though he might not be present when a photograph was taken. Before
briefs were filed, however, due to the demise of Judge English, the action
was dropped. State ex rel. Beck v. English, No. 34435, Nebraska Su-
preme Court, March 24, 1958. The method of enforcement of Canon 35 in
Nebraska, therefore, is still in doubt. [Ed.]
38 Brownell, Press Photographers and the Courtroom-Canon Thirty-Five
and Freedom of the Press, 35 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1955). [Ed.]: Criti-
cism of Canon 35 has become increasingly vigorous on the part of both
attorneys and members of the various media. For the most recent re-
marks, see Lyman, Courts, Communications and Canon 35, 46 A.B.A.J.
1295 (1960). Cf. Delehant, Let us Retain and Enforce Canon 35, 6 NEB.
STATE B.J. 85 (1957); Daly, Radio and Television News and Canon 35,
6 NEB. STATE B.J. 121 (1957).
39 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. 1958).
40 Id. at 740, quoting In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465
(Colo. 1956).
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The court said that the doors of the courts must be open to the
press "to report courtroom abuses, evil and corrupt influences
which despoil and stagnate the flow of equal and exact justice."
4 1
The Oklahoma court held that television, broadcasting or photo-
graphing of the trial was within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, subject to certain general standards of dignity and decorum.
Specifically, Justice Brett held Canon 35 to be an "unwarranted pre-
sumption" since there is "neither disturbance, distraction, nor lack
of dignity or decorum" when the telecasting is "properly super-
vised." [Justice Brett had pointed out that the television cameras
were stopped whenever the defendant objected.] In effect, the
Oklahoma court suggested that the American Bar Association had
no right to legislate nor to dictate to the courts: "When abuses of
discretion occur, we [in Oklahoma] will meet them on appeal and
not in a manner of preconception .... -41
In summary, it is submitted that the rights of the accused
should take clear priority over freedom of the press,43 and that the
right to a public trial is the defendant's right and not the right of
public communications media. This view is demonstrated in United
States v. Kleinman44 where in 1952 the federal court refused to
adjudge guilty of contempt of Congress a witness who had refused
to testify before a committee of Congress with television cameras,
newsreel cameras, news photographers and radio microphones "in
close proximity." In acquitting the defendant the Court said:
45
41 Id. at 740.
42 Id. at 742 and 745. The words of Mr. Justice Douglas are pertinent:
"Newspapers, radio and television are in the hands of men who have
their own political philosophy and their own ideas as to what justice is
and how it should be administered. Some newspapers dominate a com-
munity. When ownership of the paper is combined with ownership of
the radio and television station, the community may become saturated
with one point of view. We have had publishers who were tyrants and
sought to impose their will on the courts as well as on the people."
Douglas, supra note 28, at 840.
43 In an Ohio case, a newspaper photographer was fined $100 and costs
for taking a photograph through the window of a door of a juvenile
court while the court was in session. Under Ohio law the court may
punish a person who misbehaves ". . . in the presence of or so near the
court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." OHIO REV.
CODE § 2705.01 (1953). The conviction was upset upon the ground that
the record failed to show that the press photographer had, in fact, ob-
structed the administration of justice. In re Greenfield, 82 Ohio L. Abs.
120, 163 N.E.2d 910 (1959).
44 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952).
45 Id. at 408. Cf. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d
421 (1960), in which the trial court's rule barring photography and tele-
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The only reason for having a witness on the stand, either before
a committee of Congress or before a court, is to get a thoughtful,
calm, considered and, it is to be hoped, truthful disclosure of facts.That is not always accomplished, even under the best of circum-
stances. But at least the atmosphere of the forum should lend
itself to that end.
The American Bar Association in 1958 considered amendment
of Canon 35 "in light of modern conditions of the practice of law
and the administration of justice" so that all proceedings will be
"conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. '46 While retaining
the ban against photographing, broadcasting or televising of actual
court trials, the proposed 1958 amendment would grant permission
to photograph or televise only ceremonial occasions in courtrooms
such as naturalization or induction proceedings.
In this regard, specific mention should be made of the 1956
ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court which allows judges in that
state to decide whether portions or all of certain trials are to be
photographed or broadcast, according to their judgment in specific
cases: 
47
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity
and decorum. Until further order of this Court, if the trial judgein any court shall believe from the particular circumstances of a
given case, or any portion thereof, that the taking of photographs
in the court room or the broadcasting by radio or television of court
proceedings would detract from the dignity thereof, distract the
witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, or otherwise
materially interfere with the achievement of a fair trial, it should
not be permitted; provided, however, that no witness or juror in
attendance under subpoena or order of the court shall be photo-
graphed or have his testimony broadcast over his express objection;
and provided further that under no circumstances shall any court
vision from the courthouse sidewalks of any participant in or at the trial,
was approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which held that the
sidewalks were within the ambit of the court under the Georgia statutorylaw granting the court the power "to preserve and enforce order in itsimmediate presence, and as near thereto as is necessary to prevent in-
terruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings." GA. REV.CODE § 24-104 (1959). Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, supra at-,114 S.E.2d at 424. Certiorari was denied by the United States SupremeCourt on November 7, 1960, despite petitioner's claim that severe curtail-
ment of freedom of the press and a substantial blackout of news-gather-ing would result. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 364 U.S. 290, 888(1960). See also Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927).46 See 83 ANNUAL REPORTS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 643-69(1958). Cf. Id. at 669, 284, and 155-56. See also Panel Discussion, Fair
Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16 (1955). [Ed.]
47 In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956).
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proceeding be photographed or broadcast by any person without
having first obtained permission from the trial judge to do so, and
then only under such regulations as shall be prescribed by him.
But fears of press photography in the courtroom similar to
those implied in the Canons of Judicial Ethics have been expressed
from the bench. Judge Gourley, in Tribune Review Pub. Co. v.
Thomas,48 thoughtfully opined:
The very thought of members of the press and/or amateur
photographers and others employing cameras, no matter how silent
and concealed, to photograph different parties and witnesses to a
court proceeding while the parties and the court are engrossed
in the determination of matters of tremendous moment to the
parties involved, is repugnant to the high standard of judicial de-
corum to which our courts are accustomed, and, indeed, may prove
an opening wedge to a gradual deterioration of the judicial process.
... [T]he greatest danger to freedom may well stem from those
who seek the license and luxury of increased liberties at the ex-
pense of the processes which feed life blood to our free institutions.
III. MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
A. TELEVISION AND BROADCASTING
Although Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court, declares that "the taking
of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial
proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
court room shall not be permitted by the court"-the televising and
broadcasting of congressional hearings, for example, have been
more and more frequent. The hearing often becomes a trial in
which the entire nation sits as a jury. The television trial certainly
saturates the country with such prejudice or partiality against an
accused that a fair trial may later be next to impossible. As stated
by Professor Harry W. Jones: 49
If several million television viewers see and hear a politician, a
businessman or a movie actor subjected to searching interrogation,
without ever having an opportunity to cross-examine his accusers
or offer evidence in his own support, that man will stand convicted,
or at least seriously compromised, in the public mind, whatever the
later formal findings may be.
Indeed, the use of television in these inquisitorial procedures puts
in jeopardy some of our basic tenets. Commercial sponsorship of
such telecasts can only cheapen or vulgarize processes of govern-
48 153 F. Supp. 486, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
49 Jones, Congress and Television: A Dissenting Opinion, 37 A.B.A.J. 392
(1951).
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ment that should be sacrosanct. Television trials may give incom-
plete presentations of the evidence; the sensational parts of the
hearing may distort or slant it one way or another. These are un-
doubtedly some of the reasons behind the observation in a national
magazine after the Army-McCarthy hearings on television in 1954: . o
"If the hearings have proved anything to date it is that courtroom
procedure, with its strict rules on conduct and introducing evi-
dence, is a most marvelous human invention."
B. RECORDINGS
Recently, there has been some judicial sentiment favoring the
making of sound or tape recordings of trials involving the death
sentence. In the Chessman case,' for example, a tape or sound
recording would have perpetuated the voices of all parties including
the judge, and thus have guaranteed the accuracy of the record for
appeal.
C. TRANSCRIPTS
The transcript of the trial and in particular of a trial judge's
charge to a jury, was the subject of a New York case brought by
the New York Post Corporation against a trial judge.52 After the
acquittal of a probationary police officer charged with the crime
of manslaughter in the first degree arising out of the fatal shooting
of a fifteen-year old boy, a New York Post reporter requested a
transcript of the official stenographic notes of the judge's charge
to the jury. Although the court stenographer agreed to furnish the
requested transcript, he later refused to do so upon order of the
judge. The lower court refused to compel the court stenographer
to furnish the transcript, upon the ground that a newspaper had
no special right or privilege not possessed by an ordinary citizen,
and furthermore that New York statutes did not accord to the
general public the right to demand a trial transcript. The New
York Appellate Division affirmed upon the ground that, while the
50 "The Men McCarthy Made Famous," Life Magazine, May 17, 1954, p. 47.
51 Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). The trial court reporter had
died before he could transcribe his notes, and his successor, a, relative
of the one of the prosecutors, prepared the transcript. Chessman con-
tended that the notes of the decreased trial reporter could not be trans-
scribed with reasonable accuracy.
52 New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 143 N.E.2d 256, 163
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957). For the lower court decisions, see 208 Misc. 322, 143
N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1955), and 286 App. Div. 760, 147 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1955).
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stenographer was free to furnish a copy of the charge to any other
person if he chose so to do, one not a party to the action possesses
no clear right to obtain such a transcript, if the stenographer re-
fuses to furnish it, even upon payment of the prescribed fees.5 3
Finally, in 1957, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed, holding that any member of the public, not a party to the
action, has an enforceable right to the transcript upon payment of
the prescribed fees.54 Judge Fuld, speaking for the Court, de-
clared: 55
We are all agreed that fundamental considerations of public
policy demand that court proceedings in a publicly held trial be
open to the fullest public scrutiny, so long as the case is not one in
which preservation of secrecy in respect of the court records has
been recognized .... It has been aptly observed that "A trial is a
public event" and "What transpires in the court room is public
property.". . . The function of publicity, especially in the form of
newspaper reporting and comment, as "an effective restraint on
possible abuse of judicial power" is, indeed, one of the funda-
mental safeguards of a free society ...
The Court then touched briefly upon the freedom of the press: 56
The Constitution of this state explicitly mandates that "judicial
opinions or decisions shall nevertheless be free for publication by
any person" (art. VI, § 22). The trial judge's charge to the jury
may properly be regarded as a "decision" within the ambit of that
provision, since the charge embodies the law of the case as decided
and declared by the trial court .... The clear import of the con-
stitutional mandate is that neither the legislature nor the courts
may unreasonably curtail or restrict free access by all persons to
judicial opinions and decisions .... No other rule is conceivable
in a society nurtured on freedom of discussion of matters of public
interest. Without access to the official records, the press might well
be hampered in reporting opinions or decisions for fear of trans-
gressing the limitations imposed by the law of libel, that the report
be a "fair and true" one (Civ. Prac. Act § 337). To permit a judge
to prohibit the stenographer from transcribing or furnishing copies
of decisions rendered by him would thwart and tend to nullify the
basic purpose of the constitutional safeguard.57
53 New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 286 App. Div. 760, 147 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1955).
54 New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 143 N.E.2d 256, 163
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957).
55 Id. at 682, 143 N.E.2d at 258, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
56 Id. at 684, 143 N.E.2d at 259-60, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
57 Judge Fuld also examined Section 66 of the New York Public Officers
Law as to whether the newspaper has a clear legal right to compel the
court stenographer to furnish the transcript: "[T]here is no doubt
that it expresses a strong legislative policy to make available to public
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Judge Fuld distinguished United Press Ass'n v. Valente,58 pointing
out that: 59
[T]here is no possible conflict between the position asserted by the
petitioner and the rights of the defendant. Indeed, the trial has
been concluded, and neither the defendant nor the People could
in any way be prejudiced by allowing the petitioner or any other
member of the public to have a copy of the charge.
D. TRIAL PUBLICITY
Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association dates from 1908 and relates to the practices of some
lawyers of "trying their cases in the newspapers" or "getting pub-
licity by sensational statements" to press, radio and television. In
New York the State Bar Association has adopted an amended canon
20 which reads as follows:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to make, or to sanction the
issuance or use by another of any press release, statement or other
disclosure of information, whether of alleged facts or of opinion,
for release to the public by newspaper, radio, television or other
means of public information, relating to any pending or anticipated
civil action or proceeding or criminal prosecution, the purpose or
effect of which may be to prejudice or interfere with a fair trial in
the courts or with the due administration of justice. The foregoing
inspection and access all records or other papers kept 'in a public
office,' at least where secrecy is not enjoined by statute or rule. Ef-
fectuation of the policy in favor of full publicity accordingly demands the
broadest possible interpretation of the scope and content of that section,
so far as some overriding consideration of policy does not forbid.
"It requires no straining to reach the conclusion that the office of an
official court-appointed stenographer is a 'public office' within the mean-
ing of section 66. * * *"
[Accordingly] "* * * section 301 of the Judiciary Law and section
66 of the Public Officers Law should be interpreted as entitling any
member of the public to obtain a transcript from the stenographer,
at least, of the trial judge's charge to the jury, upon payment of the
prescribed fees." Id. at 686, 687, 143 N.E.2d 260-61, 262, 163 N.Y.S.2d 415-16,
417.
As to the furnishing of a transcript to an indigent defendant, see
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357
U.S. 214 (1958), holding that the state of Washington could not deny
such a defendant a copy of the record of his trial merely because he
could not afford to pay for it. Otherwise a convicted defendant with
money could have appellate review of his trial while a convicted de-
fendant without money could not.
58 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
59 New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677, 688, 143 N.E.2d 256,
262, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 417 (1957).
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shall not be applicable to publications of statements made in Court
or to quotations from public records of the Court, or from deposi-
tions, or filed or served pleadings, or affidavits filed or submitted
to the Court. However, this canon shall not be so construed as to
limit the right of an attorney in good faith to divulge information
for publication in reply to any public statement which adversely
affects the interest of his client, provided that the information
is supported by facts and does no more than contradict or mitigate
the effect of said statement.
Violation by attorneys of Canon 20 has resulted in many reversals
in higher courts of verdicts and judgments for the prosecution in
criminal cases, because lawyers' comments to the press before or
even during trial had either poisoned in advance the entire panel of
eligible jurors or tended to make the verdict the result of things
said and done outside the courtroom, a typical case being Delaney
v. United States.6 A survey of these instances revealed that lawyers
themselves "handed out stories" to the press, and were therefore
to blame for prejudicial comment. However, it appears that there
has seldom been a disbarment proceeding brought against such
lawyers. The mild and palliative tone of Canon 20 probably ac-
counted for its disuse:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or antici-
pated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally,
they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a par-
ticular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional
to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should
not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in
the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any
ex parte statement.
Certainly the enforcement of an amended Canon 20 would
promote fair and open trial because it prevents the leakage to the
jury of items of evidence not displayed in open court to the accused
or his counsel, but introduced, via newspapers, behind their backs
when there is no chance to submit them to standards by which
admissibility is governed. Canon 20 does not interfere with the
press except that lawyers may not feed them gossip or matter, the
purpose or effect of which may be to prejudice or interfere with a
fair trial or with due administration of justice. Many details of a
case can be published in advance if their publication will not have
an undesirable tendency.
Canon 20 is not limited to criminal cases, but also governs
lawyers' conduct in civil cases with particular reference to matri-
60 199 F.2d 107 (lst Cir. 1952).
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monial actions, stockholders' suits, proxy fights, and the like. Canon
20 is aimed at lawyers who make it a practice of trying their cases
in the newspapers as a means of forcing a settlement contrary to
justice, or of frightening a timid opponent, or in extreme cases of
frightening the judge and jury, too.
IV. CONCLUSION
The right to an open or public trial, the right to a speedy trial,
and the right to a fair trial are guaranteed under the Sixth Amend-
ment, and the fair administration of justice is the cherished right
of all citizens. It is agreed that our traditional concept of a pre-
sumption of innocence until proof of guilt must not be placed in
jeopardy, yet this human want is occasionally in conflict with the
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to know and par-
ticipate in the governmental process. Such a conflict, stemming
perhaps from an unfortunate lack of faith in the tenets of our
democratic institutions, should be resolved by our courts in such a
way as to satisfy a maximum of human wants with the minimum
of sacrifice of others. Our courts have adapted to our changing
needs, and the dynamism of life today requires a resolution of this
conflict.
